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1Royalty reform and illegal reporting of harvest volumes
under alternative penalty schemes
Abstract:
We study royalty reform in a framework where tax evasion or royalty non-payment through
underreporting of harvesting is possible, under two alternative penalty schemes. By introducing a
revenue-neutral change in royalty progression (or tax regression), we demonstrate several new
findings for how actual and reported harvesting change. First, while higher royalty tax
progression will always decrease actual harvesting, its effect on reported harvesting is sensitive to
the penalty scheme imposed by the government. If the fine is levied on the evaded royalty
payments, a rise in revenue-neutral royalty rate progression will increase reporting harvesting.
But when the fine is levied on undeclared harvesting, the reverse happens – here, a tax-revenue
neutral rise in a lump-sum royalty fee will decrease illegal reporting of harvesting and harvest
income. Second, independently of the penalty scheme, an increase in revenue-neutral tax
progression will decrease actual harvesting of the concession.  The results are important in
evaluating recent claims made in the forestry literature regarding reform in royalties for
concessions-based forest economies.
Keywords: illegal logging, royalty progression, tax evasion, deforestation.
JEL classification: D81, H26, Q23.
21. Introduction
In most of the countries with tropical forests, concessions are the primary means by
which timber is sold from government forests (Walker and Smith 1993, Gray 2000).  Royalties
charged against harvesting of concessions are very important to government revenue collections
(Gray 2000, Amacher et al. 2001).1  Royalties are typically applied to harvest volumes or values,
and can exist in various forms depending on whether they are differentiated or progressive in
terms of net harvest rents.
It has been argued that existing royalty systems are poorly-used instruments for either
collecting government revenues or promoting sustainable harvesting of concessions (Grut et al.
1991, FAO 1997).  The primary criticism is that royalty rates are too low, providing little
incentive for reduced harvesting of large concessions, and providing little rent capture for the
government (Gray 2000, Vincent 1990, Bushbacker 1990). Governments in tropical countries
also inefficiently enforce these tax systems, so that large amounts of harvests are not reported to
taxing authorities.  These illegal activities further reduce royalty revenue generated by the
government and increase net rents to harvesters of concessions (ITTO 2002, Repetto and Gillis
1988).
These criticisms have sparked discussions of reform of royalties in many tropical forest
settings.  The discussion has thus far has not, however, acknowledged that royalties and
government revenue collections are linked, and that both cannot be considered independently of
illegal activities such as excess logging or underreporting of harvest volumes.  High royalties may
appear to be a panacea and a way of increasing government revenues while curbing excess
logging, but they can also change the incentive for harvesters to cheat and attempt to evade the
                                                
1 For instance, recent interest in Brazil’s new concession plan is motivated by the need to raise government
collections through a royalty-based charge system (MMA/PPF 2002).  Malaysia also has similar interests
(FAO 1997).
3royalty payments. Cheating is a well-known virtue of concessions when applied in developing
countries (ITTO 2002).  The probability that harvesters can be caught by the concession-awarding
government is also a factor in their illegal activity choices.  All of this means that simply calling
for higher royalty rates is a problem with no clear solution.   It also means that reform in any
royalty system is not as simple as raising the royalty rate, like many believe.
In this paper, we focus on commonly suggested royalty reforms in the literature, namely
using either higher (unit or ad valorem) royalty rates for harvesting, or using a combination of a
royalty rate and a lump sum forest fee or subsidy applied to concessions rights (for a discussion
of these suggested reforms, see e.g. Gray 2000).  Unlike other work, we investigate these reforms
under assumptions that illegal reporting of harvesting might occur.  Thus, we will take explicitly
into account the interaction of royalties, actual harvesting, and reported harvest volumes in a
concessions setting, where the government has decided to allocate a concession of a certain size.
There is a positive probability that the government can detect cheating; the probability level may
reflect how efficient the government is in observing cheating, or how frequently the government
chooses to audit and enforce illegal harvest reporting. Two types of penalty structures are
assumed, fines based on evaded (underpaid) royalties for harvesting, and fines levied against
undeclared harvest volumes.2
A formal model is developed to study whether incentives for illegal logging and actual
harvesting can be reduced by a reform in royalty systems. Given the suggested combination of a
fee (which could alternatively be a subsidy) and a unit (ad valorem) royalty, a conventional model
of tax evasion under progressive (regressive) taxation applies well to our problem. We analyze
the suggested royalty reform by changing the royalty systems toward greater or lesser progression
(or regression), in a manner that keeps expected government royalty revenue constant. With such
                                                
2 The specification of fine structures is natural for our tropical forestry problem and has support in other
literature on tax evasion (e.g., see Yitzhaki 1974 for penalties levied against evaded taxes and Allingham
and Sandmo 1972 for penalties levied on undeclared incomes).
4a policy, an increase in the royalty tax rate and the tax exemption level (or an increase in the lump
fee and a decrease in the royalty tax rate) means higher progression (regression), in the sense that
the average tax rate increases (decreases) more rapidly with increases in the taxable amount
(Musgrave and Thin 1948).
We analyze royalty reform in a manner that holds expected royalty collections constant.
This requirement is important in providing the incentive for a government, interested in revenue
generation, to reform royalties in ways that protect remaining tropical native forests and also
reduce illegal harvesting behavior. The importance of ensuring revenue-stability during a reform
in policies is clear from the recent literature that establishes a correlation between tropical country
debt levels and the rates of deforestation, or literature linking royalties specifically to revenue
collection (Poore 1993).
This paper is the first to consider royalty reform under the possibility of illegal reporting
of harvest levels.  While some researchers have considered incentives for illegal logging at the
micro harvesting level (Boscolo and Vincent 2000, Clarke et al. 1993), there is virtually no work
that considers royalty reform in the presence of illegal logging, even though there have often been
calls to raise royalty rates in the applied literature. Our approach here is closest to work in general
public finance theory that considers government tax choices and the potential for tax evasion.
Much of this theory has been developed for reform in tax systems where tax evasion is an
endogenous function of the tax rate or tax progression chosen by the government (for surveys of
the tax evasion literature see e.g. Cowell 1987 and Myles 1995).
We proceed as follows. In section 2 we present the basic framework, including the time
sequence of decisions, penalty schemes and tax progression features of the problem, and also
provide precursory comparative statics of reported harvesting under alternative penalty schemes.
In section 3 we examine the relationship between a tax-revenue neutral change in royalty tax
progression and reported harvesting under alternative penalty schemes, while section 4 reports
5results concerning the effect of royalty tax progression on actual harvesting.  Finally, there is a
brief concluding section.
2. Basic Framework
We consider a representative concession and harvester. The concession exists at a point
in time and has already been chosen to be a given fixed size. However, the harvester can decide
how much of the concession to harvest and how much of an illegal activity to engage in. We
study one of the more common forms of illegal activities associated with concessions in practice,
i.e., the underreporting of harvest volumes by the harvester to the government. This is a critical
problem in tropical countries, as it has been recently estimated that harvest volumes are 80-90
percent underreported in many countries (ITTO 2002, Gray 2000).
2.1. Time Sequence of Decisions, Royalty Progression and Penalty Schemes
Following the order of harvesting and processing, we assume the following time
sequence of decisions, depicted in Figure 1. First, the harvester determines the level of actual
harvesting, ,Q  once a concession is awarded by the government.  Second, once the harvester
removes a given amount of volume, it must then decide how much of this to report to the
government, ,  thereby determining what its royalty payment obligation will equal. Finally,
uncertainty regarding detection or non-detection of cheating by the government is revealed.  If the
firm is caught cheating, then penalties are imposed. The problem is solved using backward
induction.
Figure 1: Time sequence of decisions
1                                      2                                      3                         
Q ψ Detection/non-detection
(p)
6The harvester takes the timber price q as given.3 Also the probability of detection by the
government p and the fine f will be exogenous parameters for the harvester.  The first assumption
is consistent with the types of small country contexts where the problem of illegal logging is
acute. The second assumption is also natural and consistent with other work in natural resource
enforcement (Milliman 1986, Sutinen and Anderson 1985).
As the harvester must report a part of actual harvesting to the government, it can be
described conveniently by,
QQr  , (1)
where rQ  is the harvest level declared (i.e., reported), Q is actual harvesting within the
concession, and  is the proportion of actual harvesting that is reported, 10  .  A decrease
in   represents an increase in royalty evasion.
The government manages the concession and imposes a royalty against volume harvested
by the firm.  The firm pays the royalty once it harvests and declares reported harvest volume.  We
assume the following structure for this volume-based royalty,
)( rQt  (2)
where t is the royalty rate, Q  is the volume of timber reported to the government from
concession, and r is an exemption level determined by the government, i.e. the amount of
reported volume not subject to the royalty charge.4 Note that this volume-based royalty could
easily be given as a value-based royalty using timber price and applying the royalty against the
value of timber harvested from the concession.  In practice royalties applied to concessions often
                                                
3 This is the most common assumption.  An exception is Marrelli 1984, who uses a simple model of
monopolistic behaviour to study the relationship between tax evasion and tax incidence.
4 As will be seen later on, a combination of a royalty tax and a lump-sum fee yielding a regressive tax
system can be obtained from (2) by assuming that r is negative and independent of the royalty rate, so that
tax revenue with reported harvesting is rQt   (for the details, see Appendix 4).
7appear in the form of (2).5 The form in (2) is also convenient in that it allows us to examine a
specific royalty progression.6  Consider that a simultaneous increase in the tax exemption r  and
the royalty tax rate t  is equivalent to an increase in royalty progression, in the sense that the
average tax rate increases more rapidly in the tax base.
If the harvester is detected cheating a fine penalty is imposed.  Suppose the government
levies the penalty with a fine rate of  f.  This fine rate is exogenous and is determined by laws. It
is applied to harvesters who are caught evading royalty payments through underreporting of
harvested volume.7  We will consider two alternative penalty schemes that cover two possible
infractions involved with misreporting harvests once a cheater is caught.  The first is a penalty
levied against the amount of the royalty that the cheating harvester evades.  In this case the
penalty is written )1( ftQ .  The second is a fine levied against undeclared harvest volume, so
that the penalty is written )1( fQ .8 
The harvester’s profits depend on harvesting, the illegal activity, the probability of
detection, and the penalty scheme if caught cheating. Let q be the timber price and C(Q) be a
convex cost of harvesting, i.e., 0)(;0)(  QCQC .9  First, consider the case where the
penalty is levied on the evaded royalty payment. If harvester is not detected cheating, then its net
rents are given by (3), but if the cheating firm is caught and the penalty is enforced, then its net
rent is given by (4),
                                                
5 This is the case in many tropical forest countries, including Indonesia, the Philippines, and parts of Latin
America (Gray 2000, Vincent 1990, Amacher et al. 2001). The royalty considered here is similar in spirit to
an ‘area royalty’ if we think of a concession in terms of total volume of harvest in a given area. In this case,
some quantity of harvest volume is usually exempted from the tax payment made by the harvester.  Many
concessions have been applied in this manner.
6 For a discussion of various forms of tax progression, see the classic paper by Musgrave and Thin (1948).
See also chapters 6-8 in Lambert (1993) for a further analysis.
7 Our inclusion of an exogenous fine is consistent with the observation that fines are typically set by the
legal sector.  This is a common assumption in the environmental economics literature where fines and
enforcement of polluting firms are studied.
8 The implications of these penalty schemes have been studied in a different context by Koskela (1983).
9 In what follows, derivatives of functions with one argument are denoted by primes, while partial
derivatives of a function with two or more arguments are denoted by subscripts of the parameter we are
differentiating with respect to.
8trQCtqQY  )()(  (3)
)1(  ftQYZ  (4)
The second case, where the penalty is levied on undeclared harvest volume, will be denoted using
a superscript u. Thus, the rents to the harvesters are given by (5) and (6) for the cases when the
harvester is not caught and is caught, respectively:
  trQctqQY uuuu  )( (5)
)1( uuuu fQYZ  . (6)
Finally, we make the conventional assumption about preferences for risky behavior by
the harvester. We assume that the harvester is risk-averse, so that he maximizes the expected
utility of harvest revenue by choosing actual and reported harvest volumes. Armed with these
definitions and assumptions we now solve the first and the second stage of the model in the next
two subsections.
2.2. The Choice of Reported Harvest Volume under the Penalty Scheme Levied on the
Evaded Royalty
Using backward induction, we first solve the second stage, where the harvester chooses
the extent of their illegal activity via the choice of reported harvesting  , taking actual
harvesting from the first stage as exogenous.  The harvester chooses reported harvest volume to
maximize expected utility, )()()1()( ZpUYUpEU  .
9The first order condition for reported harvesting when the penalty rate f  is levied
against the amount of the evaded royalty payment is,
0)()1()()1(  ZUfpYUpEU

. (7)
A condition for an interior solution, where the firm does cheat, requires,
0)1(0)()1()()1(1  pfZUfpYUpEU  . (8)
This condition makes sense, because if the expected fine pf were equal to one, then the harvester
would not have an incentive to underreport harvest volumes, and then 1 .  Using the first
order condition (7), and assuming now that cheating indeed occurs ( 1 ), we can show that an
interior solution requires the following condition,
)(
)()1()1(
ZU
YUpfp


 (9)
Equation (9) shows that the harvester sets the ratio of marginal utilities for cheating and not
cheating equal to the expected fine minus the detection probability. The second-order condition
holds and is given in the Appendix 1.
The first order condition for reported harvesting when the penalty rate f  is levied
against undeclared harvesting is,
0)()()()1(  uu ZUtfpYUtpEU u

. (10)
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An interior solution requires that,
 0)(0)()()()1(
1


pftZUtfpYUtpEU u
uu


, (11)
which can be interpreted analogously to equation (8). Equation (11) requires that the expected
fine pf must be less than the royalty rate t paid by the harvester if volume is declared.  If these are
equal then the harvester will never cheat. We show in Appendix 1 that the second order condition
holds.
As a precursor to further analysis, we must determine how the harvester’s decision to
underreport harvest volume depends on parameters such as actual harvesting, the royalty rate, and
the royalty exemption level.  A summary of comparative statics results for these parameters are
presented in Table 1 and derived in Appendix 2.  As Table 1 shows, in the second stage the
solutions to (7) and (10) define an optimal choice of royalty evasion, through the choice of
reported harvesting, as a function of actual harvest level in stage 1, the royalty rate, and the
royalty exemption level, ),,( rtQ  and ),,( rtQuu   .
The results in Table 1 are partly sensitive to risk aversion behavior.  Under decreasing
absolute risk aversion (DARA) and a penalty levied against the evaded royalty, reported volumes
increase as either the royalty rate is increased, actual harvest levels increase, or the royalty
exemption
Table 1: Comparative Statics of Reported Harvest Volume
Parameter Penalty on Evaded Royalty
CARA                         DARA
Penalty on Undeclared Harvesting
CARA                          DARA
Royalty Rate (t)  +                                   +   -                                    +/-
Royalty Exemption (r)  0                                    -   0                                    -
Actual Harvesting (Q)  +                                   +   +                                    +
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level increases. These results are due to the negative income effects of the royalty rate on reported
harvest levels, while the positive income effect is due to the higher royalty exemption level.
The results remain qualitatively the same for the royalty rate and actual harvesting under
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), but now the royalty exemption level has no effect on
reported harvesting. Finally, when the penalty is levied on undeclared harvesting, the effects of
actual harvesting and royalty exemption levels on reported harvesting are qualitatively similar,
but the effect of the royalty rate is now ambiguous.
2.3 The Choice of Actual Harvest Volume under Alternative Penalty Schemes
When choosing the actual level of harvesting in the first stage, the harvester takes the
optimal value of reported harvesting as given and maximizes his indirect expected utility
function. When the fine is levied on evaded royalties expected indirect utility is written,
*)(*)()1(* ZpUYUpEUMax
Q
 , (12)
where * denotes an indirect utility function and ψ has been set to its optimal level, ψ*, so that Y*
and Z* are given by (2) and (3) with ψ = ψ*.  Using the envelope theorem,10 the first order
condition for (12) becomes,
bZUpaYUpEUQ ˆ*)(ˆ*)()1(0
*
 ,  (13)
where 0)('ˆ *  tQCqa  and .0))1(()('ˆ **   ftQCqb  The second order
condition is given in Appendix 1.
                                                
10 Here, the envelope theorem guarantees that the indirect effect of harvesting vanishes, i.e. 0QEU  .
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When the penalty for cheating is levied based on undeclared harvesting, the harvester’s
problem is to maximize,
)()()1( *** uuu
Q
ZpUYUpEUMax
u
 , (14)
where 
uY *  and uZ *  are defined by (5) and (6) with ψ = ψ*. The first order condition for the
harvester’s choice is: uQuQ
u
Q uuu
EUEUEU 

***
 . The second RHS term is zero using the
envelope theorem, and thus we can write,
bZUpaYUpEU uuuQu
~)(~)()1(0*  , (15)
where, 0)('~ *  uu tQCqa  and .0))1(()('~ **  uuu ftQCqb 
The comparative statics for actual harvesting in terms of the royalty rate and the royalty
exemption under the two alternative penalty schemes are derived in Appendix 3 and presented in
Table 2.
Table 2: Comparative Statics of Actual Harvest Volume
Parameter Penalty on Evaded Royalty
CARA                          DARA
Penalty on Undeclared Harvesting
CARA                          DARA
Royalty Rate (t)    -                                      -   -                                      -
Royalty Exemption (r)    0                                     +   0                                      +
In the case of DARA the royalty rate will have a negative effect on actual harvesting, but the
royalty exemption level will have a positive effect under both penalty schemes. This can be
interpreted as follows. Under DARA the royalty rate will have a negative substitution and a
negative reinforcing income effect, while the royalty exemption level will have a positive income
13
effect. Under CARA, the income effects will vanish so that the royalty exemption level will have
no effect, but the royalty rate will have a negative substitution effect.
The findings presented in Tables 1 and 2 turn out to be important for our policy reform
analysis to follow. The impacts of royalties and exemption levels on cheating and actual
harvesting depend not only on risk preferences, but also on the nature of penalty schemes. For
decreasing absolute risk-aversion we have
Proposition 1. In the case of DARA, if the penalty rate is levied against the evaded royalty
payments, then a higher royalty rate reduces actual harvesting but increases
reported harvesting, thus decreasing illegal activities. The effect of the royalty
rate is ambiguous when the penalty is levied against undeclared harvesting. In
both cases higher royalty exemption levels increase actual harvesting but
decrease reported harvesting.
Interestingly, higher royalty rates and royalty exemptions work in opposite directions. As we will
demonstrate in the next two sections, their overall effects under royalty reform will therefore
depend on the penalty scheme, and sometimes (but not always) one should use the royalty fee  -
instead of a royalty exemption – to increase reported harvesting as the literature on royalties
suggests.
3. Tax-Revenue Neutral Royalty Progression and Reported Harvesting
Now we examine the consequences of alternative penalty schemes for royalty policy
reform.  Recall our initial interest was to examine royalty reform towards progression (regression)
under two conditions, 1) the government is interested in revenue generation and wishes to keep
expected revenue collection constant, and 2) illegal reporting of harvest volumes occurs and can
undermine government revenue collections. Hence, the specific policy question we answer in this
section is: What is the effect on reported harvesting of an increase in the royalty tax rate and
14
royalty exemption, done in a manner that holds constant expected royalty revenue collections of
the government?
A. Penalty Charged on Evaded Royalty Payments
The social planner’s expected tax revenue, when the penalty rate is levied against the evaded
royalties, can be written,
  trpftQRe  )1(  . (16)
The first term in brackets is the expected royalty revenue collected from reported harvesting, and
the second term is expected revenues derived from penalties charged against evaded harvest
volumes (if the harvester is caught with probability p). To examine reform in the royalty system
that holds revenue constant we first totally differentiate (16) with respect to policy instruments r
and t, and reported harvesting  , to obtain
dpfQdt
t
Rdr
e
dRe
)1(20  . (17)
The total effect of the royalty rate and royalty exemption on reported harvesting can then be
expressed as
drdtd rt   ,  (18)
Substituting dr from (17) into the RHS of (18) gives the effect of changing royalty progression on
reported harvesting, holding expected tax revenue constant,
])1(1[
2
0 Qpf
t
R
dt
d
r
e
rt
dRe 






. (19)
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From Table 1, we know that 0r , and at an interior solution for reported harvesting, 1-pf > 0
must hold from (8).  Thus the denominator of (19) is positive.
The numerator must be examined more closely to determine its sign.  First we write the
numerator in terms of absolute risk aversion, .(.)'(.)''(.) UUA   Under DARA, 0(.) A  and
Y > Z implies A(Y) < A(Z), while under  CARA, 0(.) A  and A(Y) = A(Z).  Using these
definitions, under DARA the numerator term is positive, i.e.,
0
)]()1()([
)1()1)(()1()()]()([
2 



ZAfYAtQ
QpfZAQpfYAYAZAr
t
Re
rt

 . (20)
Under CARA, we previously showed that underreporting of harvesting is not sensitive to the
royalty rate 0r , and therefore equation (20) simplifies to,
0)1()1()1()1(2 




ttf
pfpf
t
Re
rt

 . (20’)
Returning to (19), we have therefore shown that 0
0


edRdt
d
.  Summarizing, we have,
Proposition 2. Under a penalty scheme where the fine is charged against the evaded royalty
payments, higher royalty progression, implemented to keep expected royalty
collections constant, will increase reported harvesting and thereby decrease
cheating.
The result in Proposition 2 shows an interesting policy result.  The government can reduce
underreporting of harvest volumes if royalties are reformed toward higher progression, even
when it is done in a manner that holds government revenue collections constant.  Thus, the
revenue needs of the government and the need to keep cheating controlled are compatible with
16
higher progression under this penalty scheme. Intuitively, when the penalty rate is charged on
evaded royalty revenues, the royalty rate and the royalty tax exemption will induce positive and
negative income effects, respectively, but the positive income effect dominates for the harvester.
Thus, the firm facing this type of penalty will increase reported harvesting, and illegal activities
will decrease.
This result runs counter to the literature’s recommendation of using a combination of a
forest fee on the concession right and a royalty rate. We have shown that a subsidy, and not a fee,
leading to progressivity of the royalty rate is needed to control cheating when the penalty rate is
charged on evaded royalty revenues. The difference in our result and the recommendation from
the literature is our explicit consideration of cheating and penalty schemes.
B. Penalty Charged on Undeclared Harvest
As above we again return to our policy question under this alternative penalty scheme:
What is the effect of a change in tax progression on reported harvesting, undertaken in a manner
that holds expected royalty collection revenues constant, when penalties are levied on undeclared
harvesting?  The government’s expected revenues for this penalty case are,
trpftQR uuueu  )]1([  . (21)
Taking the total derivative with respect to policy instruments and reported harvesting, in a
manner that holds expected revenue constant, yields
uu
uu
dR
dpftQdt
t
rQdr eu 
 )]([
0




. (22)
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Now the total effect of the royalty rate and the royalty exemption level on reported harvesting can
be written explicitly as,
drdtd ur
u
t
u
  (23)
Substituting the RHS of (22) for the dr term in (23) gives the effect of changing royalty
progression on reported harvesting, holding expected tax revenue constant,
uu
r
uu
u
r
u
t
dR
u
Qpft
t
rQ
dt
d
eu ][1
)(
0 








(24)
The denominator of (24) is positive because we previously showed 0ur , and we also know
that for an interior solution, t – pf > 0.  Concerning the numerator, we can write it using
comparative statics and the first-order condition (10), i.e.,
  0)(')(')1()()( 1   uu
uu
u
r
u
t ZpUYupEUt
rQ
uu


 (25)
Using (25) in (24), we see that 0
][1
)(
0






uu
r
uu
u
r
u
t
dR
u
Qpft
t
rQ
dt
d
eu 



.  Summarizing we have,
Proposition 3. Under a penalty scheme where the fine is assessed against undeclared harvesting,
higher royalty progression, which keeps expected royalty collection revenues
constant, will decrease reported harvesting and thereby increase cheating.
Proposition 3 leads to a completely different conclusion than in the case where penalties are
levied against evaded royalty payments (Proposition 2).  When the penalty rate is charged on
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undeclared harvesting volume, an increase in the royalty rate will induce positive income and
negative substitution effects on reported harvesting, while the royalty tax exemption change will
induce a negative income effect.  Thus, a tax-revenue neutral increase in royalty progression will
have a net negative substitution effect, thereby increasing cheating and underreporting of harvest
volumes from the concession.
According to Proposition 3, lower royalty progression will increase reported harvesting.
This suggests that a regressive royalty system with a minimum lump-sum fee is the proper design
to decrease cheating when the fine is assessed against undeclared harvesting. We demonstrate this
formally in Appendix 4. Thus, this penalty case is now consistent with the suggestion in the
literature noted earlier regarding royalty reform.
4. Tax-Revenue Neutral Royalty Progression and Actual Harvesting
Much of the literature discusses the role of royalties in changing actual harvesting, i.e.,
proposing for instance that royalties should be increased in order to reduce deforestation and
concession-based harvest expansion, or to allow governments to capture greater rents from
concession harvests.  The previous section considered reported harvesting, which is of course an
important component of cheating and resulting penalties.  We now focus on incentives
concerning the harvester’s choice of actual harvesting. Like above we ask the following policy
question: what is the effect of a change on royalty progression on actual harvesting, undertaken to
hold expected royalty collection revenues constant?  Again, we consider both the case of
penalties levied on evaded royalties and undeclared harvesting.
A.  Penalty Charged on Evaded Royalties
Expected royalty revenues are now written as,
19
trpftQRe  )]1([  . (26)
Proceeding as above, we obtain,
dQQpfpfdt
t
Rdr Q
e
dRe
])1()1([20   , (27)
so that the difference here compared to the earlier case is that now we have to consider changes in
reported harvesting that arise from changes in actual harvesting. The total effect of the royalty
rate t and the exemption level on actual harvesting is given by the following total derivative,
drQdtQdQ rt  (28)
Using (27) in (28) gives the effect of changing royalty progression on actual harvesting, holding
expected royalty revenues constant,
])1()1([1[
2
0 QpfpfQ
t
RQQ
dt
dQ
Qr
e
rt
dRe  



(29)
The second term in the denominator is positive because, as we showed previously, 0rQ and at
an interior solution, 0)1(  pf and 0)1()1(  Qpfpf Q  because 0Q .  We
continue under the plausible assumption that the total expression in the denominator is positive.
The numerator can be expressed as follows,
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


(30)
where ).()1( rQQfx   Using this definition and equation (26) we can simplify the
term in braces to obtain,
0))]1(*)((*)()1[(   tZUpYUp (31)
Now, using (31) together with (29), we obtain, .0
0


edRdt
dQ
 We summarize this in the
following:
Proposition 4. Under a penalty scheme where the fine is levied against evaded royalty payments,
higher royalty progression, implemented to keep expected royalty collection
revenues constant, will decrease actual harvesting.
According to Proposition 4 royalty rates should be higher if exemptions are also increased, as
long as the objective is to reduce deforestation and still keep royalty revenues collected by the
government constant. This policy package reduces actual harvesting. The economic interpretation
is straightforward. A higher royalty rate has negative substitution and income effects on actual
harvesting, while a higher royalty exemption level, used to keep tax collection constant, has a
positive income effect. Thus, if the government keeps expected royalty collection revenues
constant, the income effects vanish and the negative substitution effect remains. Note also that if
actual harvesting tends to be larger than the size of the concession awarded by the government to
the harvester, i.e., we have another form of illegal logging present, then higher progression could
be used to reduce it.
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B.  Penalty Charged on Undeclared Harvest
Finally, we consider the second type of penalty scheme. Proceeding as before, expected
royalty collection revenues are written for this penalty scheme as,
trpftQR uuueu  )]1([  . (32)
Analogous to the earlier case, we first derive the total derivative of expected revenues (32) with
respect to the exemption level, royalty rate, and actual harvesting, taking the relationship between
actual and reporting harvesting into account. Then, we solve for 
0eudR
dr , which depends on
finding the expression for the total derivative of actual harvesting, drQdtQdQ ur
u
t
u
 .
Finally, we substitute from the former into the latter and obtain,
)]()1([1
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t
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t
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

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


(33)
In the denominator, 0rQ , 0
u
Qu
 , and t - pf > 0.  We assume that the denominator is positive
from hereon.  For the numerator, we can follow procedures similar to the derivation of (27) – (31)
and obtain,
0)]()()1{[()()( 1*   uuuu
QQ
uu
u
r
u
t ZUpYUpEUt
rQQQ uu 

(34)
This implies,
0
0


eudR
u
dt
dQ
(35)
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We now finally have,
Proposition 5. Under a penalty scheme where the fine is assessed against undeclared harvesting,
higher royalty progression, which holds expected royalty collection revenues
constant, will decrease actual harvesting.
The interpretation of Proposition 5 is similar to Proposition 4. Both show that the effect of tax-
revenue neutral royalty progression is to reduce actual harvesting under both penalty schemes,
unlike in the case of reported harvesting.  In Appendix 4 we show that a regressive tax-revenue
neutral reform, that increases the lump sum fee and compensates it by decreasing the royalty rate,
will increase actual harvesting. Thus, the desirability of the suggested combination of a lump-
sum fee and a royalty rate very much depends on whether unreported harvesting is the only form
of illegal logging or not.   If it is, then a regressive tax system performs best, because it reduces
unreported harvesting and intensifies the use of the concession.   If the harvester has an incentive
to harvest more than the concession right allows, then a regressive system is less desirable.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we study royalty reform in economies with forest concessions.  This has
become an important issue in the forestry literature, as it has been argued that royalties applied to
concessions harvesting are too low, and that they do not allow enough rent capture by the
government, thus creating incentives for deforestation. We develop a tax evasion model to
examine the suggested reform towards a combination of a forest fee or subsidy applied to a
concession right and a higher royalty rate on harvesting. This model allows us to ask how
progression or regression of this combination can be used to decrease illegal harvesting activities
in the important case where expected government revenues remain at constant levels. Our
analysis is the first to examine royalty reform in a context of illegal logging-related activities,
when cheating might not be perfectly detected by the government.
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A critical part of our analysis is to understand the incentive for harvesters to engage in
illegal (underreporting) of harvest volumes, which is a common problem throughout the world in
developing economies with concessions. We examine how royalty reform affects reported
harvesting and actual harvesting of a concession under two different penalty schemes, where the
cheating harvester when detected must pay either a fine based on the evaded royalty payment, or
one based on undeclared harvesting.
We model the linkages between concession harvesting, cheating and detection in three
stages.  Actual harvest volume is decided upon by the harvester in the first stage.  In the second
stage, the harvester chooses what fraction of actual harvesting is reported to the government for
royalty payment.  Finally, the harvester’s uncertainty regarding detection or non-detection of
cheating by the government is revealed.
We show that while higher royalty tax progression serves to decrease actual harvesting
independent of the penalty scheme, its effect on reported harvesting is sensitive to the penalty
scheme. In particular, under a penalty scheme where the fine is levied on evaded royalty
payments, an increase in royalty progression that holds expected government revenues constant
will increase reported harvesting and decrease cheating by concession harvesters.  However,
when the penalty scheme has the fine levied on undeclared harvesting, the reverse happens; a rise
in revenue-neutral royalty progression will decrease reported harvesting. In this case, more
appropriate reform is a regressive royalty system, because higher regression will increase
reported harvesting.
These results add to the current policy debate surrounding royalties and help us assess the
often-suggested reform of royalty systems towards a combination of a minimum lump-sum fee
and a royalty rate. Obviously, this suggestion has some merit, but we have demonstrated that this
combination should be progressive or regressive depending on the penalty scheme implemented
with the royalty system, and depending on the possible under- or over-use of the concession
rights by the harvester.   Illegal logging, i.e. harvesting more than the concession right permits,
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can be reduced by a progressive royalty system.  Under-use of the concession right can be
corrected by a regressive tax system.  Thus, there is considerable scope to taylor royalty systems
to the particulars of each country and the characteristics of illegal logging in the country.
In our paper we have focused royalty reform analysis by keeping expected royalty
collection fixed, and we have assumed an exogenous probability of detection and penalty by the
government.  The first assumption is important because it provides incentive for poor developing
country governments to reform royalties.  In future work, it would be interesting to treat
enforcement as a potential policy instrument.  In that case, one could ask how the government
should jointly design royalties and enforcement schemes to both capture rents from concession
harvesting, control illegal logging-related activities, and limit deforestation.
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Appendix 1: Second-order conditions of reported and actual harvesting
Reported harvesting
A. Fine levied on evaded royalty payments
The second order condition for the choice of reported harvesting is,
0)()1()()1( 2  tQZUfptQYUpEU

.  Using equation (9) and the definition of
absolute risk aversion, (.)'(.)''(.) UUA   to rewrite the marginal utilities, we can show that
the second order condition for a maximum holds,
0)]()1()([)()1(  ZAfYAtQYUpEU

 A.1
B. Fine levied on undeclared harvesting
The second order condition is
0)]()()()1[( 22  uuu QZUtfptYUpEU uu

. Using 
)(
)()1()( u
u
ZU
tYUptfp 
and making use of the definition of absolute risk aversion we have,
0)]()()([)()1(  uuuuu QZAtftYAtYUpQEU uu
 .  A.2
Actual harvesting
A. Fine levied on evaded royalty payments
The second order condition becomes,
)(*)](*)()1[(ˆ*)(ˆ*)()1( 22* QCZUpYUpbZUpaYUpEUQQ  . From the first-
order condition 
*)('
ˆ*)(')1(ˆ
ZU
aYUpbp   and using absolute risk aversion as before, we have
0)(*)](*)()1[(]ˆ*)(ˆ*)([ˆ*)()1(*  QCZUpYUpaYAbZAaYUpEUQQ   A.3
B. Fine levied on undeclared harvesting
Using the interior solution 
)(
~)()1(~
u
u
ZU
aYUpbp   and the definition of absolute risk aversion
we have,
0)()]()()1[(]~)(~)([~)()1(*  uuuuu
QQ
QCZUpYUpaYuAbZuAaYUpEU uu  A.4
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Appendix 2. Comparative statics of reported harvesting
A. Fine levied on evaded royalty payments
Obtaining the partial derivative of (7) with respect to the Q (exogenous in the second stage),
using (9), and making use of the definition of absolute risk aversion, we have,
0])()()[()1(]
)(
)(
)(
)()[()1( 





 aYAbZAYUpb
ZU
ZUa
YU
YUYUpEU Q , A.5
where a  and b  are defined in the text. Using A.1, the effect of a change in actual harvesting on
reported harvesting can be expressed as,
)]()1()([
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bZAaYA
EU
EU Q
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




 , A.6
Under DARA higher actual harvesting increases reported harvesting and the same happens under
CARA, when 0)1( 
QQ

 .  
For the tax exemption we have the following cross partial derivative using (7),
tZUfptYUpEU r )()1()()1(  A.7
Using the definition of absolute risk aversion and equation (9) to rewrite equation (A.7), we have
)]()1()([
)]()([
ZAfYAtQ
ZAYAt
EU
EU r
r





 A.8
The sign of equation A.8 depends on risk aversion behavior. Under CARA 0r , but under
DARA, 0r , so that a higher exemption will decrease reported harvesting.
Finally, for the royalty rate we have from (7),
])1([)()1()()1( fQZUfpQYUpEU t   A.9
Thus, the effect of the royalty rate is given by,
)]()1()([
))1(()()(
ZAfYAtQ
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





 , A.10
where again we have made use of (9) and absolute risk aversion. The numerator of A.10 is
positive when 0(.) A  and 1 .  Thus under DARA, a rise in the royalty rate increases
reported harvesting, while under CARA it simplifies to 0)1( 
tt

 .
B. Fine levied on undeclared harvesting
For the impact of actual harvesting we have the following cross partial derivative,
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where, ua  and ub  are defined in the text.  Equation A.11 can be rewritten, using absolute risk
aversion and the first-order condition (11) as
])()([)()1( uuuuu
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A.12
Thus the effect of actual harvesting is given by,
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Under DARA, 0u
Qu
 , and under CARA,
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Next we consider a effect of the royalty exemption level. We obtain,
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Thus we have,
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Under DARA, the sign A.16 is negative, while it equals zero under CARA.
Finally, for t  we use again 
)(
)()1()( u
u
ZU
tYUptfp


   to obtain
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Thus we have,
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The first bracketed term in the numerator represents the substitution effect that follows from the
royalty instrument.  Given the penalty scheme, the royalty causes a distortion to the harvester’s
choice of reported harvesting. ut  is ambiguous under DARA, and negative under CARA.
Appendix 3. Comparative statics of actual harvesting
A. Fine levied on evaded royalty payments
First consider the cross partial derivative of EU* with respect to both t and r,
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]ˆ*)(ˆ*)()1[(* bZUpaYUptEUQr  A.19
Making use of (15) and the absolute risk aversion measure, we can rewrite A.19 as,
*)](*)([ˆ*)()1(* YAZAaYUptEUQr  A.20
The effect of the royalty exemption r on actual harvesting Q is given by,
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Thus, actual harvesting increases as the exemption level is raised under DARA, but under CARA
0rQ .
Next we examine how actual harvesting responds to the royalty rate,
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Making use of (15) again, *QtEU  can be written,
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where .0)1( 



rQ
Qfx

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Thus, 0* QtEU , so that 0tQ  for .0(.)' A
B. Fine levied on undeclared harvesting
For the tax exemption, we need to compute the following cross partial derivative,
]~)(~)()1[(* bZUpaYUptEU uuu
rQu
 A.23
Using (32) gives,
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which is positive under DARA and zero under CARA. This implies that the impact of an increase
in the exemption level on actual harvesting depends on absolute risk aversion,
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Comparing A.25 with A.21 we see that the penalty scheme does not matter in terms of the effect
of exemption levels on actual harvesting.
The impact of the royalty rate can be derived using procedures similar to A.23 - A.25 and
is given by,
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Appendix 4. Regressivity and the fine on undeclared harvesting
A. Reported harvesting
The objective function of the harvester is,

)()()1( ZpUYUpEUMax
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
, A.27
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where  rQctqQY uuu  )()(  , )1( uufQYZ  , t is  the royalty tax rate and r is
the lump-sum forest fee.  The first-order conditions are
0)(')()(')1(0  ZUtfpYtUpEU u

,
and the interior solution implies .0 pft  The second-order condition is
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For the lump sum fee and the royalty tax rate we have
  0'0)()()(')1(















	



 Aif
EU
YAZAYUpt
uu
u
r

  A.28
    0'0
?)()()(')()(')(')1(















			
	
 Aif
EU
YAZAQZUtfpZpUYUp
uu
uu
u
t


 A.29
The government’s expected tax revenue is,
  rpftQR uuue   1( A.30
The changes in taxes and reported harvesting, which will keep A.30 constant, are
given by,
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where the denominator is positive because 0ur  and 0 pft  at the interior
solution. In terms of the numerator we have,
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The tax scheme is regressive because the average tax rate decreases with the
reported tax base, i.e. rQtR uu     so that uuuu Q
rt
Q
R

 . The higher is
the lump-sum fee r , the more regressive is the tax scheme. Thus, a higher lump-sum
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fee level r  compensated by a lower royalty rate t  will increase the reported
harvesting.
B. Actual harvesting
The first-order condition for actual harvesting due to the envelope theorem can be
written as
0~)('~)(')1(0  bZpUaYUpEU uuuQ , A.33
where 0)('~  uu tQcqa   and 0))1(()('~  uuu ftQcqb  .
The second-order condition is 0uQuQEU .
The cross-derivatives of the first-order condition with respect to for the lump-sum
fee r  and for the royalty rate t , respectively, are
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The government’s expected tax revenue is,
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The changes in taxes and actual harvesting, which will keep A.35 constant are
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where the denominator is assumed to be positive under .0'A  In terms the
numerator, A.34a and A.34b indicate that
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Hence a higher lump-sum fee level r  compensated by a lower royalty rate t  will increase the
actual harvesting, as discussed after Proposition 5.
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